Saving for Post-Secondary Education in Individual Development Accounts by Zhan, Min & Schreiner, Mark
Working Paper 
 
Saving for Post-Secondary Education 
in Individual Development Accounts 
  
Min Zhan and Mark Schreiner 
 
Working Paper No. 04-11 
 
2004 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
 
Saving for Post-Secondary Education in  
Individual Development Accounts 
 
 
 
 
Min Zhan, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor 
School of Social Work 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
mzhan@uiuc.edu 
 
Mark Schreiner, Ph.D. 
Senior Scholar 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
schreiner@gwbmail.wustl.edu 
 
  
Working Paper No. 04-11 
 
2004 
 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
George Warren Brown School of Social Work 
Washington University 
One Brookings Drive 
Campus Box 1196 
St. Louis, MO 63130 
tel 314-935-7433 
fax 314-935-8661 
e-mail: csd@gwbmail.wustl.edu 
http://gwbweb.wustl.edu/csd 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: The ADD project is funded by a consortium of foundations and is the first 
systematic test of IDAs.  We especially thank Ford Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, FB 
Heron Foundation, and Metropolitan Life Foundation for their support of ADD research. We also 
acknowledge Lissa Johnson, who managed the ADD research and led the creation and refinement of MIS 
IDA; Margaret Clancy, who created and implemented quality control in data collection and worked 
countless hours with program sites to ensure accurate data.  
 Abstract 
 
Low-income people have less access to opportunities for post-secondary education, and the 
welfare reform in 1996 further limited access for welfare recipients. Since welfare reform, there 
has been an increasing interest in strategies meant to enhance the well-being of low-income 
people through education and the development of human capital. In this study, we examine how 
low-income people saved for post-secondary education in Individual Development Accounts 
(IDAs) in a nationwide demonstration. IDAs are structured accounts that provide matches for 
savings used for home purchase, microenterprise, retirement savings, and post-secondary 
education. We examine how savings outcomes differed between participants who intended to use 
their savings for post-secondary education and other participants.  
 
Results indicate that low-income people can save and build assets for post-secondary education 
in IDAs. Furthermore, saving for post-secondary education moderates some relationships 
between savings outcomes and other characteristics of participants and of IDA programs. Finally, 
we discuss implications for policy and social-work practice for using IDAs to promote the 
development of human capital by low-income people.         
                                    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that education has a wide variety of positive 
economic and social effects on individuals, families and society as a whole (Becker, 1993; 
Beverly & Sherraden, 1997). Furthermore, the returns to education in the labor market have 
increased since the early 1970s (Mishel, Bernstein & Schmitt, 1997; Mishel & Burtless, 1995). 
Studies have found that the rise in earnings inequality during the past two decades is closely 
related to differences in educational attainment (Amott, 1994; Bernhardt & Dresser, 2002). In the 
meantime, despite the fact that both men and women in general have made steady progress in 
their levels of education over the years, low-income people and other disadvantaged groups have 
faced decreasing  access to opportunities for post-secondary education (Mortenson, 2000).  
 
Among the many factors related to low access of low-income people to post-secondary education, 
inadequate financial resources is one of the most important ones (Boldt, 2000; Gittell, Gross, & 
Holdaway, 1993). In particular, the increasing costs of college and the cuts in need-based 
financial aid have made post-secondary education less affordable for many low-income people 
(Mortenson, 2000; Sherraden, 1991). The welfare reform of 1996 has focused on work 
requirements and has further limited access to post-secondary education for welfare recipients. 
Low-income people may often be forced to make short-term decisions about investment in their 
own human capital, and it is important for social policy to help them save and invest for their 
future education.  
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) is an approach to help low-income people save and 
accumulate financial assets for post-secondary education. IDAs are targeted to low-income 
people and provide incentives and an institutional structure conducive to saving (Schreiner, et al., 
2001). IDAs provide participants with matches for savings used for home purchase, 
microenterprise, retirement savings, and post-secondary education. This paper investigates the 
following questions: Do IDA participants who intend to use their savings for post-secondary 
education have different savings outcomes than other IDA participants? And if so, what 
demographic factors and program-design characteristics are associated with the differences? 
Answers to these questions may provide lessons that will help guide modifications to IDA policy 
and program design in ways that might improve savings outcomes for those intending to use 
their IDA for post-secondary education.  
 
Background 
 
Access to Post-Secondary Education for Low-Income People 
The rising costs of college and the decline of social investment in higher education since the 
early 1980s have made post-secondary education less affordable for low-income households. 
According to Mortenson (2000), in the 1990s, both the federal government and some states have 
moved from need-based financial aid to merit-based aid. In addition, the federal government has 
aggressively expanded educational loan programs in the past two decades, with more of the costs 
of these programs borne by borrowers instead of taxpayers. These factors made college less 
affordable for low-income people, especially considering that college aid previously had greater 
impact for the poor than for the non-poor (Dynarski, 2002).  Related to these changes, gaps in 
educational attainment by income level started to widen in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, by 
the mid-1990s, a student from a family in the top income quartile was 10 to 12 times more likely 
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 than a student from the bottom quartile to have completed a bachelor’s degree by age 24, but in 
1970 and 1980, the numbers were 6 and 4 (Mortenson, 2000).  
 
Beyond these changes to college costs and the structure of financial aid, welfare reform made 
post-secondary education—especially four-year college degrees—more difficult for low-income 
people. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) block grant (U.S. Congress, 1996). This law transformed the 60-year-
old welfare system into a work-based system which requires states to place increasing 
percentages of adults in work or work-related activities. Major changes under the PRWORA 
include work requirements, time limits on receipt of cash assistance, and greater control of 
program rules by states. 
 
TANF’s work-participation mandates have shifted the focus of welfare-to-work programs away 
from education and training toward immediate job placement. The new system of welfare 
provision includes a number of regulations that discourage welfare recipients from pursuing 
post-secondary education. First, TANF is designed to place recipients directly into jobs. States 
are penalized unless they put a large share of their adult recipients into work programs. This 
makes states less likely to provide education or meaningful job training. Second, job programs 
under TANF are narrowly defined, and most post-secondary education and job training do not 
count as “work”. For example, recipients enrolled in post-secondary education for longer than a 
12-month period are, for the most part, excluded from a state’s calculation of its work-
participation rates (Greenberg, Strawn, & Plimpton, 1999). Third, recipients are limited to 60 
months of benefits (whether or not consecutive), and states can specify shorter time limits. Poor 
women with children and limited resources will need more than four years to finish a Bachelor’s 
degree (Mathur, 1998; Naples, 1998). These factors can greatly reduce welfare recipients’ access 
to post-secondary education, especially 4-year college degrees. Jacobs and Winslow (2003) show 
that in the last few years, the college attendance of welfare recipients has decreased. 
 
The “quick labor-force attachment model” assumes that those who take low-paying or part-time 
jobs will eventually move up to higher-paying and full-time jobs (Pavetti & Acs, 2001). While 
welfare reform has decreased welfare caseloads, research has consistently found that those who 
leave TANF often have unstable jobs and face precarious financial circumstances (Anderson & 
Gryzlak, 2002; Johnson & Corcoran, 2003; Loprest, 2001). At the same time, studies have 
consistently found that welfare recipients who had college degrees earned more than those 
without college degrees (Karier, 1998; Mathur, 2004). This research has sparked an increasing 
interest in human-capital development strategies to enhance long-term self-sufficiency among 
welfare recipients (Strawn, 2004). Individual Development Accounts are one approach. 
 
Asset-based Theory, IDAs, and Post-Secondary Education 
Asset-based welfare theory was proposed by Sherraden (1991) and highlights the importance of 
assets rather than income. In this perspective, assets bring security, and maybe more importantly, 
assets may stimulate and facilitate the development of human capital. Consistent with the notion 
of social investment in developmentalism (Midgley, 2003; Sen, 1999), asset-based welfare 
theory emphasizes opportunities to build assets strengthen human capacities.  
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
2
 Based on this theory, IDAs were designed to help low-income people build assets for long-term 
development, including post-secondary education (Sherraden, 1988; 1991). Deposits are made in 
IDAs by low-income participants. Others could also make deposits, perhaps related to milestones 
such as completing a year of schooling or graduating from high school. Withdrawals for post-
secondary education would be matched, with higher match rates for poorer participants. In 
contrast to the current emphasis on loans and debt to pay for college, IDAs would promote a 
system of savings and assets. 
 
At the state level, asset building and IDAs are already an important policy theme. For example, 
PRWORA allows states to set up IDA programs with TANF funds and to exclude IDAs balances 
as countable assets for the purpose of qualifying for benefits. As of this writing, 22 states include 
post-secondary education as a matchable use of their IDAs (Edwards & Gunn, 2002). IDA 
programs outside the United States have focused on post-secondary education (Boshara & 
Sherraden, 2004). For example, Canada has embarked on an asset-building demonstration (called 
“Learn$ave”) that provides matches for post-secondary education and microenterprise. In 
Western Europe, national Individual Learning Accounts (ILAs) resemble IDAs for post-
secondary education. Participants in the Saving Gateway, a pilot asset-building program in the 
United Kingdom, indicated that education and training were the only restrictions on matched 
withdrawals that they would find acceptable (Kempson, McKay, & Collard, 2003). In sum, 
matched savings for post-secondary education a new policy theme that is being tested both in the 
United States and elsewhere.  
 
Purpose of the Study  
Can low-income people save for post-secondary education in IDAs? How do their savings 
outcomes differ from those of participants who are saving for other purposes such as home 
ownership or microenterprise? Given the rapid development of IDA programs, these are 
important questions. This study addresses these questions through an analysis of data from the 
American Dream Demonstration (ADD), a national IDA project. As far as we know, this is the 
first quantitative research on how low-income people save for post-secondary education in a 
structured, matched savings program.  
 
Data and Methods 
 
ADD Programs 
ADD was a national demonstration of IDAs for low-income people.  The 14 IDA programs in 
ADD were run from 1997–2001 by 13 not-for-profit host organizations (one host had two 
programs) which include community development organizations, social-service agencies, credit 
unions, and housing organizations. A consortium of private foundations provided funding. All 
programs in ADD provided matches for home purchase, microenterprises, and post-secondary 
education, and some programs also provided matches for job training, home repair, or retirement 
savings. Match rates ranged from 1:1 to 7:1, with the most common rate being 2:1.  
 
The savings data are unusually accurate, as they come directly from the monthly passbook 
savings-account records of the depository institutions.  
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 Participants 
As of December 31, 2001, ADD had 2,353 participants. A participant is defined as an enrollee 
with at least one account statement, whether or not he or she later dropped out (Schreiner, Clancy 
& Sherraden, 2002). Important characteristics of ADD participants are presented in Table 1. 
Most participants were female (80 percent), and nearly half were African-American (47 percent). 
Almost half were never-married (49 percent). About 58 percent had attended some college or 
had some type of college degree, and 82 percent were employed (full-time or part-time). 
Compared with the general low-income population (Schreiner et al., 2001), ADD participants 
were more educated and more likely to be employed. On the other hand, compared with the 
general low-income population, a higher proportion of ADD participants were women, African-
American, or never-married. These comparisons suggest that ADD participants tended to be 
somewhat disadvantaged members of the “working poor”.  
 
Measurements 
The dependent variable in this study, Average Monthly Net Deposits (AMND), is defined as 
matchable deposits plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the number of 
months of participation. AMND measures net deposits but also controls for the length of time 
that a participant has saved. All else constant, greater AMND implies greater saving and asset 
accumulation in IDAs. 
 
The independent variables include important program-related factors (also known as 
“institutional” factors) and participant characteristics. Program factors include the match rate, 
match cap, financial education, and whether participants used direct deposit into their IDAs. 
Participant characteristics include demographic information (gender, age, marital status, 
race/ethnicity, number of children, and number of adults), education and employment status, 
household income, bank-account ownership, home ownership, and receipt of AFDC/TANF. The 
regression also includes a yes/no variable that indicates whether a given participant was an 
“education saver” who made a matched withdrawal for post-secondary education or who 
declared at enrollment that he or she intended to make such a matched withdrawal. There are two 
major reasons that we include participants who have not made matched withdrawals as 
“education savers”. First, the time window for the data does not catch participants who made a 
matched withdrawal after the end of the “savings period”. This group includes a large share of 
intended “education savers”. Second, further analyses indicate that there are no significant 
differences between “intended education savers” and “actual education savers” in terms of their 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. Similar yes/no indicator variables are also 
included to mark participants who declared an intention to save for home purchase, home repair, 
microenterprise, retirement saving, or job training. Finally, the regression model includes 
interaction terms between the indicator for “education savers” and all the other independent 
variables. 
 
Analysis 
Multiple regression was used to examine how Average Monthly Net Deposits in IDAs might 
differ between “education savers” and others in ADD. AMND was regressed on program factors, 
participant characteristics, and interactions between the indicator for “education savers” and all 
other independent variables. After list-wise deletion of cases with missing values, the regression 
sample encompassed 1,979 cases. This model simultaneously estimates how the savings outcome 
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 is associated with program and participant factors, with being an “education saver”, and how 
being an “education saver” moderates the associations between AMND and other program and 
participant characteristics. Specifically, the coefficient on the (non-interacted) indicator for 
“education savers” is an estimate of the link between characteristics that are omitted from the 
regression that are associated with both “education savers” and AMND. The interaction effects 
provide estimates of how being an “education saver” moderated the associations between 
AMND and program and participant characteristics. Overall, the model intends to examine both 
whether “education savers” are different from other savers and, if they are different, why. 
 
Researchers often attempt to assess moderating or interaction effects indirectly through subgroup 
analysis (Coulton & Chow, 1992). The “sub-group” approach runs two regressions, one with 
only “education savers” and one with all others. The “interaction” model used here is to be 
preferred over the “sub-group” approach, mostly because there is no rigorous way to compare 
coefficients between two different regressions because the sample sizes and error terms differ 
(Coulton & Chow, 1992; Koeske, 1992). The coefficients across the regressions might look 
similar or different, but there is no straightforward way to test whether the apparent 
different/similarities are statistically significant. With the “interaction” model used here, in 
contrast, the p-value on a given coefficient of the interaction term immediately and transparently 
indicates whether being an “education saver” moderates that characteristic, and an F test for all 
the interaction terms as a group (along with the stand-alone “education saver” indicator) can be 
used to see whether “education savers” differ overall from other participants. 
 
Results 
 
Sample Characteristics  
There were 377 “education savers” in ADD. Of these, 40 percent had made matched withdrawals 
as of the cut-off date of the data, accounting for 21 percent of all the ADD participants who had 
made matched withdrawals at that point. Table 1 compares the characteristics of “education 
savers” and other participants. Compared with others, “education savers” were younger, more 
likely to be never-married, and had fewer children at home. They were also less likely to be 
females and less likely to be African-American. “Education savers” also had less income, were 
less likely to be working full-time, and were less likely to receive welfare. Overall, these features 
are consistent with the fact that a larger share (22%) of “education savers” were already students 
when they opened their IDAs than other savers (6%). 
 
Regression Analysis of Savings Outcomes 
The mean value of AMND of “education savers” was $19.80 (mean AMND for others was 
$18.40). Table 2 displays the results from the regression analysis on AMND. The model as a 
whole was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.01) and explained about 22 percent of the variance in 
the dependent variable. 
 
Effects of program and participant factors. Three of the four program factors were related to 
AMND. Participants who had higher match caps and those who used direct deposit saved more. 
Hours of financial education was also positively linked with AMND. Higher match rates, 
however, were negatively associated with AMND. Specifically, participants with match rates 4:1 
to 7:1 saved less than those who had match rates ranging from 1:1 to 3:1. Schreiner (2004) finds 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
5
 similar results, consistent with IDA participants being “target savers” for whom a higher match 
rate allows reaching a given asset-accumulation target with less saving. 
 
Four demographic characteristics of participants were related to AMND: age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, and number of adults. Female participants saved more than male participants. 
Older participants and those having more adults in households had higher AMND. Other factors 
in the regression constant, AMND was higher for Caucasians than for African Americans.  
 
Among participants’ socioeconomic characteristics, IDA savings were higher for those who 
attended some college or who had a degree. Also, participants with higher household monthly 
incomes saved more. This association, however, was weak; a $1 increase in monthly income was 
associated with about $0.003 more AMND. Home owners and bank-account owners also saved 
more than renters or the unbanked.  
 
Savings for post-secondary education. Variables related to “education savers” (the stand-alone 
indicator and the interaction terms) explained about 2 percent of the variance in AMND. As a 
group, the variables related to “education savers” were statistically significant (p < 0.05), 
suggesting that savings outcomes were indeed different for “educational savers”. 
 
What factors were related to the differences? Table 3 indicates that being an “education saver” 
moderated the associations of several program and participant factors on AMND. Among 
program factors, the interaction with hours of education was positive and statistically significant. 
While an additional hour of financial education was linked with $0.49 more AMND for any 
participant, regardless of whether they were an “education saver”, an additional hour was 
associated with an additional $0.71 for “education savers”. Apparently, “education savers” 
derived greater benefits from financial education than did others. Thus, an additional hour of 
financial education was associated with $1.20 ($0.49 plus $0.71) more AMND for “education 
savers” but only $0.49 more AMND for others.  
 
The interaction of education savers and match rates was also positive and statistically significant. 
The education savers with match rate of 3:1 saved much more than those with match rates 
between 4:1 and 7:1. Perhaps “education savers” are more likely than others to be “target savers” 
for whom higher matches rates are associated with dampened savings.  
 
Among participant demographic factors, savings for post-secondary education moderated the 
association of gender with AMND. While females in ADD on average saved $2.56 more than 
males, female “education savers” saved $9.05 less than female “non-education savers” and $6.49 
($9.05 – $2.56) less than male participants. Thus, the association of gender with savings flips for 
“education savers”. 
 
Similarly, although married participants on the whole in ADD had higher AMND than not-
married participants (p-value of 0.30), married “education savers” saved $11.88 less than 
married “non-education savers” and $10.02 ($11.08 – 1.86) less than non-married participants. 
For whatever reason, married participants and female participants who planned to use their IDAs 
for post-secondary education saved much less than others. 
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 Turning to the interactions with participant socioeconomic factors, home owners who were 
“education savers” saved $7.89 more than home owners who were not “education savers” and 
$11.61 ($7.89 + $3.72) more than renters. It appears that home ownership promotes saving, 
especially for post-secondary education. Perhaps unsurprisingly, students who were “education 
savers” saved $10.14 more than did students with different asset-accumulation goals. Perhaps the 
immediate saliency of the use of IDAs helped students to save for post-secondary education. Or 
perhaps students shifted existing savings or financial aid into IDAs to take advantage of the 
match. In any case, it is clear that, among “education savers”, students saved more than non-
students. 
 
Discussion and Implications 
 
Discussion 
We underscore several findings. First, being an “education saver” seems to strengthen the 
associations of some program factors with savings performance. For example, “education 
savers” seemed to benefit more from financial education than did others, perhaps because a 
higher percentage of education savers were students. Being a student might signal a greater 
motivation to learn and perhaps also better learning skills inasmuch as students are used to 
classroom learning and homework. The association between higher match rates and lower IDA 
savings was also stronger among “education savers”. The ADD data cannot reveal the reason for 
this, but it may be that “education savers” are also more likely to be “target savers” (targeting, 
for example, tuition). 
 
Second, being an “education saver” also moderates the relationship between several participant 
characteristics and AMND. Female “education savers” saved much less than other female savers, 
although female participants who were not “education savers” saved more than males. Why did 
female “education savers” save less? In ADD, 81 percent of female participants had at least one 
child at home, and 66 percent of these women were single mothers. These women and single 
mothers may face unique obstacles (for example, the need for child care) in their pursuit of post-
secondary education. If they realize that they face these obstacles only after enrolling in IDAs 
and declaring their intent to save for post-secondary education, then this may explain their lower 
savings. Of course, another possible reason is that TANF rules act as limits on the access of 
welfare recipients to higher education, and low-income women with children are those most 
likely to be affected by TANF or—even if they are not currently on welfare—those who expect 
to possibly be affected by TANF rules in the future.  
 
Married “education savers” also saved much less than other married participants. Perhaps 
married participants who planned for post-secondary education found that going to school (or 
going back to school) was more difficult than single participants. For example, married 
participants may face responsibilities (for example, childcare) or barriers within the household 
(form example, unsupportive spouses) that men or unmarried women do not have. 
 
“Education savers” who were students saved more than “education savers” who were not 
students. More than half of “education savers” either had some college education (38%) or 
already had a college degree (22%). Perhaps the pressures of paying for their education make 
saving for post-secondary education more salient for student savers. They do not have to think 
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 very far into the future to see how IDAs will be useful. In contrast, participants who are not 
already students are saving for a further-off goal and thus may end up savings less.  
 
As a caveat on the interpretation of these results, note that participants in ADD were both 
program-selected and self-selected (Schreiner et al., 2001). Therefore, ADD participants are not 
representative of the general low-income population.  
 
Implications 
The findings of this study indicate that low-income people did save for postsecondary education 
in ADD. Thus, it may be helpful to include more low-income people in the college-finance 
toolkit. For example, teaming IDAs with State College Savings Plans (“529 plans”) is one 
strategy to promote more inclusive IDAs for post-secondary education (Clancy, 2003; Clancy & 
Sherraden, 2003). After-tax contributions to 529 plans accumulate tax-free and are not taxed 
upon withdrawal if used for expenses for post-secondary education. All states but one sponsor 
529 plans, and some states (Rhode Island, Michigan, and Louisiana) encourage savings by low-
income households through matching provisions (Clancy, 2003). Given that 529 plans are run by 
government and that the government is a potential source of match funds, linking IDAs and 529 
plans could help include more low-income households in subsidized savings policies aimed at 
post-secondary education. 
 
Our findings indicate that savings outcomes were different for “education savers” and that being 
an “education saver” moderated the associations of some other program and participant factors. 
These findings may help programs design IDAs that help improve outcomes for “education 
savers”. For example, financial education was associated with greater savings for “education 
savers” than for others, probably because most of the education savers were already students and 
thus were better at being students than are non-students. This may imply that financial education 
in IDAs is not very appropriate for adults and other non-students. Therefore, adopting the 
principle of adult education more completely in financial education of IDA programs may help 
address this concern. Hogarth and Swanson (1995) highlight the importance of applying adult 
education principles to financial education for low-income people, especially the importance of 
understanding participants’ life context and experiences and bringing them into the teaching and 
learning process. 
 
We also found that students save better for post-secondary education than non-students. This 
implies that salient goals may help savings. Therefore, IDA programs may be able to encourage 
greater savings outcomes by helping to make savings goals salient, for example by role-playing 
the act of making an asset purchase. 
 
Finally, we found that household roles and household constraints on participants may affect 
savings for post-secondary education. For example, being married and/or being a woman was 
associated with lower savings for “education savers”. These participants may benefit from 
additional help to achieve their savings goals for post-secondary education.   
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 Table 1. Characteristics of ADD Participants and Comparisons of Education Savers and 
Non-Education Savers 
 
Variables Education 
Savers (N=377) 
Non-education 
Savers 
(N=1,976) 
Comparisons 
of Education 
and Non-
education 
Savers 
ADD 
Participants 
(N=2,353) 
Continuous Variables Mean Mean  t /  χ2 Mean 
Age 30  37 -11.3*** 36  
Number of adults 1.4  1.5  0.68 1.5  
Number of children 1.5  1.8 -3.36** 1.7  
Household monthly income $1,252  $1,402 -3.80*** $1,378  
 
Categorical Variables 
 
Percents 
 
Percents 
  
Percents 
Gender     
Female 74 81 8.37** 80 
Male 26 19  20 
Race/ethnicity     
White 41 37 2.77 37 
African-American 35 49 26.4*** 47 
Others 24 14 22.9*** 16 
Marital Status     
Never married 66 46 52.18*** 49 
Divorced, Separated , or 
Widowed 
19 31 24.81*** 29 
Married 15 23 10.59** 22 
Education     
Did not Complete High 
School 
20 15 5.96* 16 
Completed High School or 
GED 
20 27 6.82** 26 
Some College Education 
(no Bachelor’s Degree) 
53 51 0.36 51 
Completed 4-year Degree 
or More 
7 7 0.04 7 
Employment     
Employed Full-time 41 62 56.43*** 59 
Employed Part-time 28 22 7.56*** 23 
Not working or 
Unemployed 
9 10 0.75 10 
Students 22 6 100.01*** 8 
Banked 75 77 0.55 77 
Home Owner 14 16 1.39  
Receipt of AFDC/TANF     
Formerly 30 39 11.0*** 38 
Currently 7 11 3.26 10 
*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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 Table 2: Regression Analysis on Average Monthly Net Deposits (AMND) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Main Effects Interaction Effects 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Institutional Characteristics     
Match Rate     
(4:1 to 7:1)     
1:1 7.76*** 0.003 5.19 0.49 
2:1 6.94*** 0.003 10.17 0.15 
3:1 9.67*** 0.001 13.06* 0.08 
Monthly Savings Target 0.18*** 0.001 0.08 0.21 
Use of Direct Deposit to IDAs 3.95* 0.08 6.69 0.35 
Hours of General Financial Education 0.49*** 0.001 0.71*** 0.003 
 
Participant Characteristics
    
Age 0.16** 0.01 -0.06 0.72 
Female 2.56* 0.09 -9.05** 0.01 
Race/Ethnicity     
(Caucasian)     
African-American -7.87*** 0.001 3.50 0.29 
Others 1.68 0.33 6.23 0.11 
Marital Status     
(Never Married)     
Married 1.86 0.30 -11.88** 0.02 
Divorced, separated or widowed 0.19 0.89 -0.75 0.85 
Number of children -0.64 0.12 1.11 0.31 
Number of adults 2.33** 0.01 -0.85 0.71 
Education     
(No High School Diploma)     
High School Graduates 0.91 0.62 -1.07 0.83 
Some College, Less than Bachelor’s 
Degree 
2.92* 0.09 3.75 0.41 
Bachelor’s Degree or More 8.96*** 0.001 8.96 0.19 
Employment     
(Unemployed or not working)     
Employed, full-time -1.90 0.34 0.26 0.96 
Employed, part-time 0.04 0.98 2.46 0.65 
Students, working or not working 1.11 0.70 10.14* 0.09 
Household Monthly Income 0.003*** 0.003 0.003 0.25 
Home Owner 3.72** 0.04 7.89* 0.07 
Having Checking or Savings Account 5.27*** 0.001 -2.94 0.41 
Receipt of Public Assistance     
(TANF or AFDC Never)     
TANF or AFDC formerly -2.02 0.13 4.95 0.17 
TANF or AFDC currently -0.14 0.95 -6.30 0.27 
Intended Users of education -10.41 0.55 -- -- 
Intended users of home purchase 5.88 0.65 -- -- 
Intended users of home repair 12.83 0.32 -- -- 
Intended users microenterprises 6.92 0.59 -- -- 
Intended users of retirement 10.33 0.43 -- -- 
Intended users of job 5.14 0.70 -- -- 
F 
R2 
N 
9.71 
0.22 
1,979 
*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < .01.
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